Ключевые аспекты будущей политики Федрезерва и последствия для финансового рынка:"Код да Винчи" от госпожи Йеллен

Идеи высказанные в этом обзоре, выражают наше собственное мнение, по поводу текущей и будущей монетарной политики Федерального Резерва и других основных Центробанков из «BIG 5». В данном случае, речь идет об оценке возможной стратегии и тактики, Комитета по Открытым Рынкам ФРС США (FOMC). Мы рассматриваем не только  краткросрочную политику в рамках текущего цикла, но и  более отдаленный временной фрейм. Этот момент отражает наше желание  обозначить среднесрочные и долгосрочные ориентиры для динамики рынков, и перспектив стоимости основных финансовых активов.
 
 

В настоящий момент, есть смысл рассмотреть варианты политики Федрезерва на чуть более отдаленную перспективу, вплоть на период 2013 года, поскольку уже сейчас необходимо понять каким образом будет двигаться монетарная политика. С этой точки зрения, очень важным моментом стало выступление госпожи Йеллен. Заместитель главы Федеральной резервной системы (ФРС) США  выступила в Бостонском экономическом клубе (Boston Economic Club). Однако перед тем как перейти к анализу доклада госпожи Йеллен, необходимо еще раз обсудить действия Федрезерва в последние годы и особенно в последние месяцы.
 
 

В период 2009 — 2011 годов, Федрезерв действовал очень агрессивно, и кульминацией стал запуск программы QE — Твист, за счет которой удалось опустить процентную доходность долгосрочных трежерис на порядок. Мы уже упоминали значимость «Твист» не только для финансового рынка, но и для экономики в целом.  С помощью регулирования уровня долгосрочных процентных ставок, ФРС добился снижения безрисковой премии чтобы поддерживать приемлемую стоимость фондовых активов, и сокращать издержки на обслуживание долгосрочных обязательств со стороны Казначейства, с одновременным снижением подобных затрат для корпораций.
 
 


В определенный момент, стало казаться что Федрезерв добился определенного успеха, так как процентная стоимость обслуживания корпоративных долгов существенно снизилась и фактически компенсировала предприятиям большую часть издержек (цены на сырье, падение доходов из-за неустойчивого спроса на конечную продукцию). Очень важно — корпорации стали генерировать дополнительную прибыль и сформировали необходимый запас ликвидности на «черный день».
 
 

Одновременно, за счет сокращения  долгосрочной процентной доходности по государственным бумагам, стали падать ипотечные ставки и благодаря этому, возник локальный инвестиционный интерес к покупке недвижимости и заинтересованность в приобретении жилья со стороны домохозяйств. По замыслу Федрезерва, снижение ипотечной ставки должно было стимулировать домовладельцев к активному рефинасированию своих ипотечных кредитов, тем более что были приняты специальные государственные программы, в рамках которых можно было снижать уровень своей долговой нагрузки за обслуживание ипотечного кредита. Конечная цель — стабилизация сектора недвижимости, снижение затрат за содержание ипотеки и как следствие оживление потребительской активности и спроса.
 
 
На определенном этапе текущей политики Федрезерва, произошел «технический сбой» отчасти связанный с несколькими факторами: внешним драматизмом европейской истории, из-за чего появилась причина для пессимизма среди корпоративного сообщества; неуверенностью среди  домовладельцев по поводу долгосрочности восстановительной и ценовой тенденции в секторе недвижимости; разочарованием среди домохозяйств неустойчивой конъюнктурой на рынке труда и соответствующими «капризами» с точки зрения потребительского интереса.
 
 
С точки зрения  логики  действий ФРС в рамках «плана Бернанке» который был разработан весной 2010 года, и затем озвучен тем же летом  (конференция в Джексонн — Холле), была необходимость в немедленном предложении новой программы QE как только завершался предыдущий этап. Уже к апрелю нынешнего года, балансовый счет Федрезерва сократился почти на 15% в абсолютном выражении, по сравнению с прошлым годом. Нельзя было допускать, чтобы балансовый  счет Феда начинал сжиматься, так как стимулирующий эффект от QE в таком случае можно было считать исчерпанным. 
 
 
В этом была еще одна причина этого «технического сбоя». Председателя Федрезерва  внезапно засомневался в правильности своей оценки экономики. Эти сомнения проявились еще во время пресс-конференции господина Бернанке в апреле нынешнего года, когда он впервые за последние четыре года фактически высказал свои сомнения по поводу эффективности QE в рамках процесса снижения безработицы и даже озвучил опасения по поводу потенциального роста инфляции в случае немедленного запуска новых программ количественного смягчения.
 
 
Судя по всему, Председатель пришел к выводу о невозможности сокращения уровня безработицы без более сильного экономического роста. Все лекции и доклады господина Бернанке, которые были прочитаны в этом году, акцентированы на идее, что успехи достигнутые Федрезервом на рынке труда всего лишь временное явление и сам тренд нельзя считать устойчивым.
 
 
По его мнению, снижение уровня безработицы может отражать всего лишь обратные изменения в этом секторе, после довольно внушительного количества увольнений в период острой фазы кризиса 2008 — 2009 гг. Иными словами, Председатель стал считать текущее снижение безработицы, всего лишь коррекцией после предыдущего роста и для создания устойчивого тренда необходимо создать условия для более быстрого роста промышленного производства и увеличения спроса на конечную продукцию со стороны потребителей и бизнеса. 
 
 
Если формулировать сомнения Председателя в сжатом виде, то получается что господин Бернанке пытается решить для себя диллему. То ли текущие цифры по количеству новых рабочих мест завышены, из-за ошибочной оценки со стороны Бюро по Трудовой Статистике (BLS), поскольку даже при нынешних чахлых темпах роста ВВП, генерация новых рабочих мест в среднем по 145 000 в месяц, выглядит слишком сильно. Или наоборот, потенциал роста реального ВВП выглядит гораздо сильнее чем кажется.
 
 
При этом Председатель опасается, что если оценки реального ВВП занижены, то немедленный запуск новых QE может спровоцировать рост инфляционных ожиданий и последующую потерю контроля за ценами со стороны Федрезерва. По этой причине и появились сомнения в целесообразности стимулировать экономику только за счет количественных программ и желание взять паузу в цикле QE и пытаться поощрять экономический рост и снижение безработицы сохраняя низкий уровень процентных ставок как можно дольше.
 
 
По сути, Председатель не столько опасается  разворота инфляционных ожиданий в экономике в случае новых QE, а скорее засомневался в эффективности своей идеи стимулировать экономику через постепенное повышение капитализации фондового рынка, как своеобразного рычага, которым можно поднимать инвестиционные и потребительские настроения. То есть, для него в данном случае «игра не стоит свеч» если не будет устойчивого тренда на рынке труда и при этом возникнут повышенные инфляционные ожидания, которые могут подорвать веру в могущество Федерального Резерва как гаранта ценовой стабильности и занятости.
 
 
Таким образом, подробнейший доклад о состоянии американской экономиики и перспектив монетарной политики от госпожи Йеллен, о котором мы сейчас будем говорить, по всей видимости предназначен не только для широкой инвестиционной и академической «общественности», но призван развеять сомнения господина Бернанке и убедить его действовать еще решительнее, причем как можно скорее. 


Здесь надо отметить, что сам доклад госпожи Йеллен представляется довольно обширной научной работой и хотя в содержании этого труда очень много теории, нежели намеков на практику, доклад весьма убедителен как раз в рамках тех дискуссий, которые постоянно происходят между членами Комитета по Открытым Рынкам ФРС и в академической среде Америки.  Нет никаких сомнений в том, что именно этот доклад станет центральной темой при обсуждении дальнейших перспектив монетарной политики на ближайшем заседании FOMC 20 июня.

Фактически речь идет о «проекте  Йеллен» ( условное название) и в случае принятия и последующей реализации основных деталей этого проекта, кумулятивный эффект  можно будет сравнить разве что с воздействием на финансовые рынки предыдущей программы QE II от позапрошлого года. Подробнее читать далее.....
 

Комментарии (36)

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ДОХОДНОСТИ ПИГСОВ И ГЕРМАНИИ 

ИСПАНИЯ


ИТАЛИЯ

 
ПОРТУГАЛИЯ


ФРАНЦИЯ


ГЕРМАНИЯ 
 
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Сухов
Давно обосновался? Везёт мне на эти дела! Двоих таких откопал — ничего… Третий попался! Выкопал — а он меня за горло. Бандит оказался. Его свои же зарыли. Еле отбился. Вот сейчас тебя отрою, и будь здоров!
)))


— Везёт мне на эти дела! Двоих таких откопал — ничего… Третий попался! Выкопал — а он меня за горло. Бандит оказался. Его свои же зарыли. Еле отбился. Вот сейчас тебя отрою, и будь здоров! (товарищ Сухов) 

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«утечка» по поводу повестки дня саммита ЕС 28-29


European Union leaders will pledge “to mobilize all levers and instruments” to ensure financial stability and tackle the sovereign-debt crisis, according to draft conclusions prepared for a June 28-29 summit in Brussels.
The 27-nation bloc should “rapidly examine” EU proposals on bank capital requirements, deposit-guarantee programs and how to handle cross-border bank failures, according to the draft conclusions dated June 15, which was obtained by Bloomberg News. “The current economic situation remains unsatisfactory” and shoring up the banking sector is important to restoring growth, according to the document.


The leaders also should commit to launching the European Stability Mechanism, the 17-nation euro zone’s 500 billion-euro ($632 billion) firewall, by July 9, according to the document.


“The European Union is determined to continue to do everything necessary to put Europe on the track of growth,” the document said. These efforts should include cutting budget deficits and improving employment and other economic policies, it said.


The EU hasn’t yet agreed on how much it seeks to increase the capital, and therefore lending power, of the European Investment Bank. The draft document, without citing any numbers, showed a capital increase should take effect by Dec. 31 so the bank can invest in infrastructure projects across the EU.
Leaders will place particular emphasis on the findings of a forthcoming report on euro-area integration from EU President Herman Van Rompuy, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi, Luxembourg’s Jean-Claude Juncker and European Commission President Jose Barroso. The blueprint will offer a strategy for nations using the common currency to “go further” in their efforts to integrate economic policies while also working with the EU’s other members.

The European Commission, the EU’s regulatory arm, this month proposed requiring senior unsecured creditors to absorb losses when banks fail, in a proposal that also requires national-level resolution funds that would coordinate and backstop each other across borders when necessary. EU rules require countries to have national deposit insurance guarantee plans; as yet there are no formal proposals for an EU-wide deposit guarantee backstop.

The commission also has proposed rules to raise capital requirements, in order to meet a January 2013 deadline from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The new Basel requirements more than triple the amount of top-tier capital that banks are required to hold as a buffer against losses
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Фантазеры какие то =) Без ЕвроФРС все их «планы» гроша не стоят…
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15:04 18Jun12 RTRS-ЦБ РФ ЖДЕТ РЕЗКОГО УВЕЛИЧЕНИЯ ОБЪЕМА ОПЕРАЦИЙ «ВАЛЮТНЫЙ СВОП»,  «ЭТО БУДУТ МИЛЛИАРДЫ РУБЛЕЙ» — ЗАМПРЕД
 
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30 летние бонды испании новый рекорд по дохе

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Что-то ЦБР пока так и не дал разъяснения, а СКОЛЬКО он будет «миллиардов рублей» предоставлять через СВОП...
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А вот и разъяснения:
МОСКВА, 18 июн (Рейтер) — Банк России ждет резкого увеличения операций «валютный своп» — единственных, по которым ставки были пересмотрены в июне, — в связи с некоторым дефицитом ликвидности и обеспечения на денежном рынке, сказал зампред ЦБ Сергей Швецов.
«Ждем резкого увеличения, в разы… Это будут миллиарды рублей», — сказал Швецов журналистам в понедельник.
«Будет зависеть от того, как банки будут активно брать по 312-п (кредиты под обеспечение или поручительство). Если будут брать — будет меньше влияние, если нет — то больше», — сказал Швецов.
До того, как ЦБ понизил с 18 июня ставку по валютной части сделок «валютный своп» (Full Story), эти операции не пользовались популярностью у банков.
По словам Швецова, пока ЦБ не собирается устанавливать лимиты по этим сделкам.
ЦБ с 18 июня 2012 года изменил параметры расчета своп-разницы по сделкам «валютный своп» на срок 1 день, снизив до 6,5 процента годовых с 8,0 процента ставку по рублевой части сделок и до 0 процентов – по валютной части. До этого ставка по доллару находилась на уровне 0,25 процента, по евро — 1,0 процента годовых
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 Банк России ждет резкого увеличения операций «валютный своп» — единственных, по которым ставки были пересмотрены в июне, — в связи с некоторым дефицитом ликвидности и обеспечения на денежном рынке, сказал зампред ЦБ Сергей Швецов.
   «Ждем резкого увеличения, в разы… Это будут миллиарды рублей», — сказал Швецов журналистам в понедельник.
   «Будет зависеть от того, как банки будут активно брать по 312-п (кредиты под обеспечение или поручительство). Если будут брать — будет меньше влияние, если нет — то больше», — сказал Швецов.
   До того, как ЦБ понизил с 18 июня ставку по валютной части сделок «валютный своп» , эти операции не пользовались популярностью у банков.
   По словам Швецова, пока ЦБ не собирается устанавливать лимиты по этим сделкам.
   ЦБ с 18 июня 2012 года изменил параметры расчета своп-разницы по сделкам «валютный своп» на срок 1 день, снизив до 6,5 процента годовых с 8,0 процента ставку по рублевой части сделок и до 0 процентов – по валютной части. До этого ставка по доллару находилась на уровне 0,25 процента, по евро — 1,0 процента годовых    
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это поэтому наш рынок как стойкий оловянный солдатик?
комментарий был удален

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Foreign investors acquired C$10.2 billion of
Canadian securities in April, following a divestment of C$2.4 billion in
the previous month, Statistics Canada reported Monday.
 
     Meanwhile, Canadian investors reduced their holdings of foreign
securities by C$2.7 billion.
 
     Non-resident investors acquired C$9.0 billion in Canadian bonds
during the month, more than making up for the reduction of C$1.2 billion
in bond holdings in March. The majority of purchases were secondary
market federal bonds, mostly medium-term, with new issues of U.S.
dollar-denominated bonds by provincial governments and corporations also
contributing to inflows.
 
     Purchases of Canadian money market securities by foreigners equaled
C$2.1 billion in April, and were mostly provincial and government paper.
This follows three consecutive months of Canadian money market paper
divestment. Short-term yields increased 14 basis points during the month
in Canada.
 
     Non-residents, primarily in the U.S. sold C$941 million of Canadian
stocks, following two months of acquisitions. Canadian equity markets
fell 0.8% in April, and the Canadian dollar appreciated against the U.S.
dollar to the highest level since August 2011.
 
     Canadians pulled out an additional C$2.9 billion of foreign
long-term debt securities in April, following C$3.0 billion during the
first quarter. April's activity was focused in U.S. government
medium-term bonds, and was the largest monthly divestment since June
2011. U.S. long-term yields were down 20 basis points during the month,
with an interest rate differential favoring investment in Canada.
 
     Canadians also reduced their holdings of foreign money market
instruments for the sixth consecutive month, divesting C$388 million.
The reduction was mostly in European government paper, partially offset
by acquisitions in U.S. government Treasury bills.
 
     Canadians slowed their pace in purchases of foreign equities during
the month, acquiring C$578 million compared with C$6.3 billion in March.
Purchases were almost even between U.S. and non-U.S. equities, with this
month marking the 12th straight month of net investment in non-U.S.
foreign stocks.
 
 
 
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Спасибо большое.
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Members of SIFMA's Economic Advisory Roundtable forecast that the
U.S. economy will grow at 2.1 percent rate in full-year 2012 and will
grow at a rate of 2.1 percent in 2013.1 This outlook is slightly weaker
than the Roundtable's 2011 end-year prediction of a 2.2 per-cent growth
rate in 2012. Concerns over European sovereign debt and U.S. fiscal
policy dominate the outlook.
 
--
 
     Unemployment was expected to remain at elevated levels throughout
2012 and 2013, with levels on pace with those forecasted in end-year
2011. Survey respondents expected the full-year average unemployment
rate to drop slightly to 8.1 percent in 2012 (compared to 8.2 percent
forecasted at end-year 2011), declining to 7.8 percent in 2013.5
Full-year 2012 non-farm payroll employment gains were estimated to total
1.9 million jobs;6 for 2013, the median ex-pectation was for a slightly
weaker addition of 1.8 million jobs. Consumer spending trends, how-ever,
were expected to weaken in 2013 despite a better employment outlook,
with personal con-sumption estimated to fall to 2.1 percent in 2013,
down from the 2.2 percent expected in 2012.
 
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     The median forecast for «headline» inflation, measured by the
per-sonal consumption expenditures (PCE) chain price index, was 1.8
percent for full-year 2012 and 1.7 percent for full-year 2013.11 The
median forecast for the core PCE chain price index was 1.8 per-cent for
full-year 2012 and 1.8 percent for full-year 2013.12 The outlook for
inflation continued to be moderate for 2012 com-pared to the end-year
2011 report. Over 85 percent of respondents did not believe inflation to
be a concern in 2012, with the balance expressing only moderate
concern.13 One factor contributing to the moderate outlook on inflation
from end-year 2011 was the unexpectedly weak May 2012 non-farm payrolls
report. This concern was reflected in answers from respondents with
economic slack/employment as the dominant factor in the inflation
outlook for 2012, followed by global conditions and fiscal policy as
factors. Several respondents noted that deflationary risk was higher
than before. One noted that, aside from the volatile commodities prices,
there were no real fundamental drivers for higher inflation.
 
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     Approximately 70 percent of survey respondents expected the Fed
Funds-to-ten-year Treasury yield curve to steepen over the remainder of
2012, while 60 percent expected the future path of the TED (Treasury
bill less LIBOR) spread to remain unchanged. Opinions were also split on
the path of investment-grade spreads, with half of respondents expecting
the spread to narrow, while the other half expected the spread to remain
the same. Approximately half of respondents expected high-yield
corporate spreads to narrow, a third to remain the same and the balance
to widen.  
 
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Quantitative Easing
 
     The survey asked questions about further potential quantitative
easing by the Fed. The majority of respondents (65 percent) expected the
Fed to conduct further quantitative easing (QE3). When asked what
conditions would trigger further easing, respondents were generally in
agreement that subpar GDP and weak job growth, rising deflationary
risks, and potential contagion from Europe were the likely primary
triggers for a third round of quantitative easing. The timing for QE3
was expected to be near-term, with nearly all respondents who
anticipated further quantitative easing expecting an announcement at the
June 20, 2012 FOMC meeting and action to be taken in June to September
2012. While a majority of respondents that anticipated QE3 expect the
Fed to act through purchases of long-term securities such as Treasuries
and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), a small minority (17
percent) expect the extension of «Operation Twist» instead.
 
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U.S. Economic Growth
 
     EU Risk Dominates the Downside The European debt crisis,
normalization of private credit markets and self-correcting adjustments
by business and real estate markets remain the three most important
factors impacting U.S. economic growth. Lower oil prices and an
unexpected increase in consumer demand were the most oft-cited upside
risks to economic forecast. Other positive factors were job growth, the
recovery of the housing market and a positive resolution of the fiscal
cliff. On the downside, contagion from European sovereign debt and
banking crisis remained the domi-nant factor cited, with 75 percent of
respondents listing it among their top downside risks. When asked about
how the European debt crisis would impact U.S. GDP growth over the next
twelve months, 90 percent of respondents opined that it would lower GDP
growth by up to 100 basis points (bps). In particular, approximately
three fourths of respondents expected the possible exit of Greece from
the euro to lower the value of the euro vs. U.S. dollar, U.S. interest
rates and U.S. GDP growth, with the remaining quarter of respondents
remaining neutral on the impact to the U.S. A respondent noted that the
situation in Europe would likely continue to fester for some time, and
a Greek default and exit would be «messy, but… need not be inherently
destabilizing for the global financial system.»
 
--
 
Falling Off a «Fiscal Cliff»?
 
     The «fiscal cliff» was the second most frequently cited downside
risk. Recent discussions among policy makers and in the media have also
focused on the so-called fiscal cliff that the U.S. econ-omy is
heading toward at the end of 2012 and beginning of 2013. This fiscal
cliff encompasses four policy issues: (1) expiring tax cuts; (2) the
debt ceiling; (3) appropriations; and (4) sequestration. The majority of
respondents believed that of the four factors, expiring tax cuts would
have the greatest negative impact on the U.S. economy, followed by
sequestration, appropriations, and lastly the debt ceiling.
Three-quarters of respondents believed that the uncertainty over the
potential im-pact of the fiscal cliff would lower GDP growth by up to
100 bps in the next six months, while 15 percent believed there would be
no impact; the balance believe that the uncertainty would lower GDP
growth by more than 100 bps.
 
     All survey respondents opined that some attempt would be made by
Congress to mitigate the «fiscal cliff,» with the majority expecting a
temporary extension of the Bush era tax cuts. A few respondents expected
either reductions in, or the outright elimination of, sequestering as
well. Several commented that most, if not all four aspects of the
fiscal cliff will be postponed. Respondents generally expected some
form of a budget plan, similar to the framework put forth by
Bowles-Simpson, or a gradual phase in of fiscal cuts. Respondents
predicted that congressional action is highly dependent on the November
elections, and that the only action they might take is a short term
postponement. Nearly all respondents opined that uncertainty over fiscal
policy will continue to negatively impact GDP growth in 2013, split
fairly evenly between those expecting a negative impact of up to 100 bps
and those expecting a negative impact of over 100 bps.
 
--
 
Oil Prices
 
     Panelists placed approximately a 70 percent chance on WTI oil
prices remaining below $100 per barrel in 2012, with a 25 percent chance
of prices moving into the $101 and $150 range and only a 5 percent
chance for oil prices moving above $150 per barrel. The most likely
scenario  oil prices remaining below $100 per barrel  would have an
estimated effect of boosting GDP growth by one-fifth of a percentage
point. The $101 to $150 per barrel scenario was predicted to reduce GDP
growth by approximately a tenth of a percentage point, while the $150+
per barrel scenario would have the effect of reducing GDP growth by
two-fifths of a percentage point. Panelists noted that slower global
growth and weaker demand would put downward pressure on oil prices.
+
бриты видимо вчера отдыхали культурно, прослушали нашу подругу Ангелу, которая сказала совершенно противоположное тому что написано в Гардиан.....(можно обратить внимание на самый последний абзац) 


 
Angela Merkel is poised to allow the eurozone's €750bn (£605bn) bailout fund to buy up the bonds of crisis-hit governments in a desperate effort to drive down borrowing costs for Spain and Italy and prevent the single currency from imploding.
Germany has long opposed allowing the eurozone's rescue fund, the European Financial Stability Facility, to lend directly to troubled eurozone countries, fearing that Berlin would end up paying the bill, and the beneficiaries would escape the strict conditions imposed on Greece, Portugal and Ireland.
But Merkel has come under intense pressure as financial markets have pushed up borrowing costs for Spain to levels that many analysts see as unsustainable.
Analysts are likely to see the decision as the first step towards sharing the burden of troubled countries' debts across the single currency's 17 members, though it falls short of the «eurobonds» proposed by the European commission president, José Manuel Barroso.
A spokeswoman for Merkel said: «Nothing has been decided yet.»
The proposal was discussed on the margins of the two-day G20 summit in Los Cabos, Mexico, which has been dominated by the depressing impact of the eurozone crisis on the world economy.
G20 officials believe an announcement could be made by the leaders of the eurozone in the next few days, but stressed they remained unclear as to timing and precise content.
It would be the first time the EU bailout funds have been used directly to purchase Spanish debt. It is understood the money would come from both the €500m European Stability Mechanism and its predecessor, the €250m European Financial Stability Facility. Britain does not contribute to either fund.
Last week, EU leaders had agreed a line of credit to Spanish banks through the Spanish government, a move that failed to reduce Spanish bond yields.
The ECB purchased €210bn of mainly Greek bonds in 2010, but its involvement was stopped partly because of German opposition. This would be the first time the two bailout funds were used in this way.
The funds had been set up to bail out peripheral countries such as Ireland and Portugal, and there will be concern whether the funds have sufficient firepower to help large economies.
The German agreement to sanction the move was relayed at a meeting between Barack Obama and Merkel on Monday. The move initially prompted the US president to agree to cancel a further meeting of the eurozone leaders scheduled for late on Monday night.
François Hollande, the French president, said the meeting between the eurozone and Obama had been rescheduled for this morning to brief the Americans on «mechanisms that allow us to fight speculation». The private discussions at the G20 have focused repeatedly on the eurozone crisis, and leaders recognise that one summit is not going to fix the crisis.
British ministers were pleased the G20 communique is specific on its commitments to try to find a mechanism to address unsustainable bonds costs.
Ministers have been struck that within the eurozone there is a realisation that even with the Spanish banks' recapitalisation and a Greek election endorsing its previous bailout agreement, more needs to be done to address unsustainable bond yields.
There were renewed signs that the fiscal crisis was intensifying on Tuesday after the Spanish government announced it would delay spelling out the full results of the independent audit of its crisis-hit banks until September.
Madrid was granted a €100bn bailout from its European partners earlier this month to shore up its financial sector. But news that the full extent of the shortfall of the banks will not be known until the autumn underlined the sense of chaos.
There was speculation that the full total required could end up being far more than €100bn. Madrid was forced to pay a record 5.07% at a debt auction on Tuesday morning to borrow €2.4bn for just 12 months, prompting analysts to say Spain is edging perilously close to needing a full-blown rescue.
«The decidedly elevated bond yield levels leave a question mark firmly in place as regards the sustainability of Spain's public finances while doing nothing to temper speculation as to how long the country might hold out before looking for a more comprehensive bailout,» said Richard McGuire of Rabobank.
British government sources were stressing that any steps taken to help on Spanish bond yields were not a substitute for longer-term reforms such as European banking union, fiscal integration and even political union.
The chancellor, George Osborne, hinted at the possible deal saying the eurozone was inching towards solutions. He said: «I think there are signs that the eurozone are moving towards richer countries standing behind their banks and standing behind the weaker countries.
»There is no doubt that they [the eurozone] realise that individual measures taken in individual countries – like recapitalising Spanish banks and getting a Greek government that is in favour of staying in theeuro – are not by themselves enough" The G20 communique due to be issued later mentions «steps towards greater fiscal and economic integration that lead to sustainable borrowing costs».
British officials are pleased that the lengthy passage on the eurozone makes specific forward-looking references to improving the functioning of financial markets and breaking the feedback loop between sovereigns and banks. It also speaks of the need for a more integrated financial architecture encompassing banking supervision and recapitalisation and deposit insurance.
 
• This article was amended on 19 June 2012. The original version wrongly stated that Madrid had to pay 5.7% at a debt auction to borrow €2.4bn for 12 months, rather than 5.07%.
+
Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel on Wednesday
denied media reports that the European bailout funds EFSF and ESM are to
start buying bonds of troubled peripheral Eurozone member states on the
secondary market.
 
     «I have heard nothing of these things,» Merkel said at a joint
press conference with Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte here. While she
acknowledged that the rules allow the EFSF and the future ESM to buy
sovereign bonds on the secondary market, she stressed that «this is not
being discussed at the moment.» 
 
     Earlier on Wednesday, a German government spokesman underscored
that the EFSF and ESM won't be able to buy bonds of EMU member states on
the secondary markets without the beneficiary countries applying
formally for such aid and accepting the conditions tied to it.
 
     «Such secondary market purchases are foreseen as one of several
instruments in the EFSF as well as in the future ESM,» government
spokesman Georg Streiter said at a regular press conference here. «They
are naturally tied to conditions and there won't ever be any purchases
without conditions.»
 
     The Dutch Prime Minister stressed at the press conference with
Merkel that the new Greek government must stick to the fiscal
consolidation and reform program agreed with the EU, the ECB and the
IMF. «We assume that it will meet its obligations,» Rutte said.
 
     Streiter also said earlier today that Germany expected Greece to
abide by the reform program. But finance ministry spokeswoman Marianne
Kothe said at the same press conference that regarding the timetable of
the consolidation and reform program, «small adaptations can be made, as
has been the case before.»
 
     German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble told German weekly Die
Zeit in an interview to be published Thursday that «we did not ask too
much of Greece and we won't ask too much of Greece.»
 
     A senior EU official said Tuesday that Eurozone finance ministers
are expected to open talks on modifying the details of Greece's second
bailout program because a long period of political paralysis in the
country have caused reforms to stall.
 
+
текст фрс от 20 июня  
 
 
     Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in
April suggests that the economy has been expanding moderately this year.
However, growth in employment has slowed in recent months, and the
unemployment rate remains elevated. Business fixed investment has
continued to advance. Household spending appears to be rising at a
somewhat slower pace than earlier in the year. Despite some signs of
improvement, the housing sector remains depressed. Inflation has
declined, mainly reflecting lower prices of crude oil and gasoline, and
longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.
 
     Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to
foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects
economic growth to remain moderate over coming quarters and then to pick
up very gradually. Consequently, the Committee anticipates that the
unemployment rate will decline only slowly toward levels that it judges
to be consistent with its dual mandate. Furthermore, strains in global
financial markets continue to pose significant downside risks to the
economic outlook. The Committee anticipates that inflation over the
medium term will run at or below the rate that it judges most consistent
with its dual mandate.
 
     To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that
inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual
mandate, the Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance
for monetary policy. In particular, the Committee decided today to keep
the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and
currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of
resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium
run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal
funds rate at least through late 2014.
 
     The Committee also decided to continue through the end of the year
its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of
securities. Specifically, the Committee intends to purchase Treasury
securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years at the
current pace and to sell or redeem an equal amount of Treasury
securities with remaining maturities of approximately 3 years or less.
This continuation of the maturity extension program should put downward
pressure on longer-term interest rates and help to make broader
financial conditions more accommodative. The Committee is maintaining
its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings
of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency
mortgage-backed securities. The Committee is prepared to take further
action as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery and
sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price
stability.
 
      

текст от апрельского заседания
 
            The following is the FOMC statement released after the meeting
held April 24-25, 2012:
 
     Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in
March suggests that the economy has been expanding moderately. Labor
market conditions have improved in recent months; the unemployment rate
has declined but remains elevated. Household spending and business fixed
investment have continued to advance. Despite some signs of improvement,
the housing sector remains depressed. Inflation has picked up somewhat,
mainly reflecting higher prices of crude oil and gasoline. However,
longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.
 
     Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to
foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects
economic growth to remain moderate over coming quarters and then to pick
up gradually. Consequently, the Committee anticipates that the
unemployment rate will decline gradually toward levels that it judges to
be consistent with its dual mandate. Strains in global financial markets
continue to pose significant downside risks to the economic outlook. The
increase in oil and gasoline prices earlier this year is expected to
affect inflation only temporarily, and the Committee anticipates that
subsequently inflation will run at or below the rate that it judges most
consistent with its dual mandate.
 
     To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that
inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual
mandate, the Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance
for monetary policy. In particular, the Committee decided today to keep
the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and
currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of
resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium
run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal
funds rate at least through late 2014.
 
     The Committee also decided to continue its program to extend the
average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in
September. The Committee is maintaining its existing policies of
reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and
agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities
and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. The
Committee will regularly review the size and composition of its
securities holdings and is prepared to adjust those holdings as
appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery in a context of
price stability.
 
+
 
On June 20, 2012, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) directed
the Open Market Trading Desk (the Desk) at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York to continue through the end of the year its program to extend
the average maturity of the Federal Reserves holdings of Treasury
securities. Specifically, the Desk was directed to purchase Treasury
securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years and to sell
or redeem an equal par value of Treasury securities with remaining
maturities of approximately 3 years or less. The continuation of the
maturity extension program will proceed at the current pace and result
in the purchase, as well as the sale and redemption, of about $267
billion in Treasury securities by the end of 2012.
 
     The FOMC also directed the Desk to continue reinvesting principal
payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) in agency MBS, and to suspend, for the duration of the
maturity extension program, rolling over maturing Treasury securities
into new issues at auction.
 
     Purchases of Treasury securities for the maturity extension program
will be distributed across five sectors using the same approximate
weights that have been used in the purchases to date:
 
Nominal Coupon Securities by Remaining Maturity*         TIPS**
------------------------------------------------       ----------
 
68 Years    810 Years   1020 Years   2030 Years    630 Years
  32%           32%           4%           29%            3%
 
*The on-the-run 10-year note will be considered part of the 8- to
10-year sector.
 
**TIPS weights are based on unadjusted par amounts.
 
     This distribution could be altered if market conditions warrant.
 
     A combination of sales and redemptions of Treasury securities will
be conducted to match the amount of purchases over the program. Sales of
Treasury securities will take place in securities maturing between
January 2013 and January 2016. Securities maturing in the second half of
2012 will be redeemed  that is, allowed to mature without reinvestment
 since redeeming maturing Treasury securities has a nearly identical
effect on the portfolio as selling securities that are approaching
 
     maturity. Once the maturity extension program is completed, the
Federal Reserve will hold almost no securities maturing through January
2016.
 
     The Desk will continue to publish a tentative schedule of
operations for the following calendar month on or around the last
business day of each month. The schedule will include the anticipated
amount of redemptions, purchases and sales to be conducted, operation
dates, settlement dates, security types (nominal coupons or TIPS) to be
purchased or sold, the maturity date range of eligible issues, and an
expected range for the size of each operation. The next schedule of
operations will be released on Friday, June 29.
 
     All other program details remain the same at this time. Additional
information on the programs structure can be found in the revised
Frequently Asked Questions for the Maturity Extension Program.
+
Below are the updated Federal Reserve
projections of major economic indicators published Wednesday:
 
Release for:  June 2012
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve
Data in Percent
 
                                Central Tendency (1)
 
                        2012         2013        2014        Longer Run
 
Change in real GDP   1.9 to 2.4   2.2 to 2.8   3.0 to 3.5    2.3 to 2.5
Apr. projection      2.4 to 2.9   2.7 to 3.1   3.1 to 3.6    2.3 to 2.6 
 
--                                                                      
 
Unemployment rate    8.0 to 8.2   7.5 to 8.0   7.0 to 7.7    5.2 to 6.0  
Apr. projection      7.8 to 8.0   7.3 to 7.7   6.7 to 7.4    5.2 to 6.0 
--                                                                      
 
PCE inflation        1.2 to 1.7   1.5 to 2.0   1.5 to 2.0       2.0                                       
Apr. projection      1.9 to 2.0   1.6 to 2.0   1.7 to 2.0       2.0                                      
 
--                                                                     
 
Core PCE inflation   1.7 to 2.0   1.6 to 2.0   1.6 to 2.0        --                                      
Apr. projection      1.8 to 2.0   1.7 to 2.0   1.8 to 2.0        --                                       
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
                                    Range (2)
 
                        2012         2013         2014       Longer Run  
 
Change in real GDP   1.6 to 2.5   2.2 to 3.5   2.8 to 4.0    2.2 to 3.0 
Apr. projection      2.1 to 3.0   2.4 to 3.8   2.9 to 4.3    2.2 to 3.0 
 
--                                                                     
 
Unemployment rate    7.8 to 8.4   7.0 to 8.1   6.3 to 7.7    4.9 to 6.3
Apr. projection      7.8 to 8.2   7.0 to 8.1   6.3 to 7.7    4.9 to 6.0 
 
--                                                                     
 
PCE inflation        1.2 to 2.0   1.5 to 2.1   1.5 to 2.2        2.0      
Apr. projection      1.8 to 2.3   1.5 to 2.1   1.5 to 2.2        2.0       
 
--                                                                     
 
Core PCE inflation   1.7 to 2.0   1.4 to 2.1   1.5 to 2.2        --    
Apr. projection      1.7 to 2.0   1.6 to 2.1   1.7 to 2.2        —      
 
+
The following is an excerpt from Federal Reserve <br style="padding: 20px;" />Chairman Ben Bernanke's press conference Wednesday. <br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" />    <strong> QUESTION: </strong><br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" />     Looking back on the last four years of policy, it is been bold but <br style="padding: 20px;" />halting. You did QE-2 and operation twist, saying it would end in June, <br style="padding: 20px;" />now you extended it. How would you respond if, in several years a grad <br style="padding: 20px;" />student said you know what the problem was with fed policy at this time, <br style="padding: 20px;" />it was too incremental and the reason the economy underperformed was <br style="padding: 20px;" />because of incrementalism and what do you think about todays action <br style="padding: 20px;" />also being too incremental? <br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" />    <strong> BERNANKE: </strong><br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" />     We cut the fund rate continuously until December of 2008. Since <br style="padding: 20px;" />then we operate with nonstandard monetary tools, including asset <br style="padding: 20px;" />purchases and extension of maturities. By their nature, they tend to be <br style="padding: 20px;" />lumpy. We haven't done them in a continuous way, but our view of the <br style="padding: 20px;" />effects is the portfolio determines the level of accommodation that the <br style="padding: 20px;" />economy is receiving. In that respect, it wouldn't really be a start and <br style="padding: 20px;" />stop. Rather, whenever we have stopped purchasing the level of <br style="padding: 20px;" />accommodation already in the system, it  remains there until conditions <br style="padding: 20px;" />warrant further action. Underlying all this, of course, is the fact that <br style="padding: 20px;" />the outlook has changed. Like many other forecasters, the Federal <br style="padding: 20px;" />Reserve was too optimistic early on about the pace of recovery. We have <br style="padding: 20px;" />had to add additional accommodation going forward, as we have seen in <br style="padding: 20px;" />fact that the headwinds keep the economy from being as strong as we with <br style="padding: 20px;" />would like. Again, by the nature of these unconventional tools, they <br style="padding: 20px;" />tend to be more discreet in size, but they continue to have <br style="padding: 20px;" />accommodation affects even after pattern of purchase. We are prepared to <br style="padding: 20px;" />take further steps if necessary to promote sustainable growth and <br style="padding: 20px;" />recovery in the labor market. We are prepared to do what is necessary. <br style="padding: 20px;" />We are prepared to provide support for the economy. <br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" /> 
+
The following is an excerpt from Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke's press conference Wednesday.
 
 
    QUESTION: Many analysts have characterized today's step as somewhat
modest. Your own outlook has a much lower GDP projection, the
unemployment rate in your outlook look shows possibly no improvement at
all in the unemployment rate through the end of this year. The program
itself is smaller and of shorter duration than the original Operation
«Twist. Given this weaker outlook, why such a modest program? And when
you say you are prepared to take further action, which is a stronger
characterization than in your last meeting, does that mean you are
prepared to do a full-on new asset purchase program?
 
     BERNANKE: There has been a great deal of economic news since our
last meeting. The incoming data were somewhat disappointing, but not
entirely clear how to read them, particularly regarding seasonal
adjustment and other factors. Meanwhile, Europe has had additional
problems. We have seen some of those effects in national markets. There
is a case to be made for making additional  judgments about where the
economy is going. That being said, the step we took, the extension of
the maturity extension  program, I think it is substantive and will
provide some additional support. And yes, doing additional asset
purchases would be among the thing we would certainly consider if we
need to take additional measures to strengthen the economy.


 
           QUESTION:
 
     Looking back on the last four years of policy, it is been bold but
halting. You did QE-2 and operation twist, saying it would end in June,
now you extended it. How would you respond if, in several years a grad
student said you know what the problem was with fed policy at this time,
it was too incremental and the reason the economy underperformed was
because of incrementalism and what do you think about todays action
also being too incremental?
 
 
     BERNANKE:
 
     We cut the fund rate continuously until December of 2008. Since
then we operate with nonstandard monetary tools, including asset
purchases and extension of maturities. By their nature, they tend to be
lumpy. We haven't done them in a continuous way, but our view of the
effects is the portfolio determines the level of accommodation that the
economy is receiving. In that respect, it wouldn't really be a start and
stop. Rather, whenever we have stopped purchasing the level of
accommodation already in the system, it  remains there until conditions
warrant further action. Underlying all this, of course, is the fact that
the outlook has changed. Like many other forecasters, the Federal
Reserve was too optimistic early on about the pace of recovery. We have
had to add additional accommodation going forward, as we have seen in
fact that the headwinds keep the economy from being as strong as we with
would like. Again, by the nature of these unconventional tools, they
tend to be more discreet in size, but they continue to have
accommodation affects even after pattern of purchase. We are prepared to
take further steps if necessary to promote sustainable growth and
recovery in the labor market. We are prepared to do what is necessary.
We are prepared to provide support for the economy.

QUESTION: Interest rates are already historically low. How much
more help can an extension of Operation Twist do in order to lower
interest rates?
 
 
     BERNANKE: Interest rates are low and are being pushed down by safe
haven assets and other factors. That being said I think we can lower
interest rates more, but beyond that Operation Twist and asset purchases
work by acquiring securities in the market and bringing them onto the
Fed's balance sheet, inducing investors to move to substantive
securities. For example, an investor who sells treasury securities to
the Fed may buy corporate bonds instead. The effect will be lowering
corporate bond rates and corporate spreads. Or a bank, having sold
treasury securities, may decide to make a loan instead. So it is not
just the effect on the long-term interest rate, but there are broader
effects that feed through other asset prices, other interest rates and
other spreads, providing a broader easing in financial conditions which
is supportive to the economy.
QUESTION: Given the environment that you sketched out and the fact
that interest rates are at historically low points, would it make sense,
would it be an option for the government to issue more long-term debt at
this point and take advantage of that?
 
     BERNANKE: Well, the government is very gradually increasing the
duration of its debt  the Treasury I mean, and its has been doing that
for some period of time. There is a bit of an issue here, which is that
what the Federal Reserve is doing with the program we announced today,
the maturity extension program, is we are taking longer-term debt off
the market in order to induce investors to move into other assets and to
lower longer-term interest rates. To the extent that the treasury
actively sought to lengthen the duration of its borrowing, it would to
some extent offset the benefits of those policies. So my understanding
of what the Treasury is doing, is that they have a plan, they are
sticking to that plan, and therefore on the margin the effects of the
Fed's actions can be felt.


 
+
QUESTION:  When you speak of the fiscal cliff typically you don't
differentiate between the automatic tax hike aspect of that and the
automatic spending cuts, which leaves the impression that you are giving
equal weight to both sides. Some would contend that the automatic tax
hikes would be more onerous. How do you parse the relative importance of
those two aspects? And if I may be permitted, I am also curious to know
how the Fed is going to conduct open market operations, if as the New
York Fed statement says, by the end of this year they will essentially
have no short-term securities to use.
 
     BERNANKE:  On the fiscal cliff, just the way that the programs are
set up, the dollar amount associated with the tax expirations — tax cut
expirations, including the payroll tax cut and so on, it is larger than
the spending cuts, as I understand it. But I'm not making judgment about
individual programs. The point here is that putting all these things
together, you have a very substantial withdrawal of income from the
economy that will affect spending and will affect the ability of the
economy to recover in the short-run.
 
     Again in making decisions about how to modify those automatic
changes, Congress obviously has to look at the long-run and what is the
most efficient tax structure, what is the best way to spend our limited
resources? Those are tough decisions Congress has to make, but in terms
of the fiscal cliff, in terms of what will happen in January, it is
really the total of both spending cuts and tax increases which have the
impact that not only we, but the others like the congressional budget
office have identified as being a concern.
 
     We will still be able to do open market operations with our
securities, even if the matter of short-term debt is very low. And
indeed of course over time, as securities come close to maturation, we
will have other securities that are of short duration.
 
 
QUESTION:
 
     How much worse will the European situation have to get before it
starts seriously denting the prospects for recovery in the American
economy, and that's really changing the direction of Fed policy making?
 
     BERNANKE:
 
     Well, we hope it doesn't get worse. I think, it's already one of
the factors that has been a drag on U.S. recovery — not the only factor
by any means, there are a number of others that I've mentioned — but it
has been having an effect, and it has been having an effect on the
economies of other countries as well, countries that export to Europe.
 
     So it is a significant issue. We are hopeful that Europe will take
additional measures and do all that is necessary to stabilize the
situation and to provide the basis for an ongoing stable structure in
which banks and sovereigns are both stabilized, in which there is a
program for growth, and in which fiscal arrangements are (...) made much
clearer.
 
     So there is a lot of work to be done. Again, we think that the
policymakers in Europe have strong incentives to get this right, and
we're really hopeful that they will get it right. And we are in close
contact with them as they work on these issues.
 
     But again it is also important for us to be prepared for any
further problems that might emerge from Europe and We have been doing
that. For example, you know, we recently did our stress-tests of the
large bank holding companies, make sure they had enough capital even in
the face of is a severe financial crisis or a European crisis.
 
     We have been monitoring the exposures of banks and other financial
institutions to Europe, and of course monitoring the situation there
very closely.
 
     So we are hoping for the best, we are hoping that European
policymakers will take the additional steps they need to take to
stabilize the situation. But we are prepared in case things get worse,
to protect the U.S. economy and the financial system.
 
+
 
            QUESTION:
Are you at all concerned Operation Twist could affect the
ability of banks earning and their lending ability? Does it undercut
your ability to increase credit to consumers?
 
     BERNANKE: No, I don't think so. I have heard the argument by
lowering interest rates, you make it unattractive to lend. I don't think
that is quite right. What we are lowering is the safe interest rate, the
Treasury rate, that should make it even more attractive for banks,
rather than to hold securities,  to look for borrowers and to earn the
spread between the safe rate and what they  can earn by lending to
households and businesses.
 
     So I think macro-policy and monetary policy can in fact support
lending. Now the question arises in some context  whether there are
other barriers to lending, as exists for example in some parts of the
mortgage market.
 
     But lower interest rates on securities and other types of  assets,
all else equal, would induce banks to look for higher yielding returns
higher yielding assets in the form of loans to households and
businesses.

QUESTION:
I hear alot of conversations on a liquidity trap in the
U.S., it was a concept in Japan after the bubble burst in the Lost
Decades. Is the U.S. economy in a liquidity trap and if that happens,
how could the economy escape?
 
 
    BERNANKE: Well the U.S. economy is in a situation where short term
interest rates are close to zero, meaning that the Federal Reserve can't
add monetary accommodation by cutting short-term interest rates which is
the usual approach. It has been a theme of my own work, including work I
did on Bank of Japan, that central banks are not out of tools once the
short-term interest rates hit zero. There are additional steps that can
be taken and we have demonstrated both through communication techniques
and guidance about future policy, something the Japanese please have
done as well And also through asset purchases, something the Bank of
Japan has also done. Central banks do have an ability to provide
financial accommodation and support the recovery when short-term
interest rates are close to zero. That being said, as I previously
mentioned, these nonstandard policies are less well-understood and do
have costs and risks, but at the same time I think they can be effective
in helping the economy.


QUESTION:
(Projections) show inflation centered below 2% over the
medium term. I was just wondering if you could explain why? And secondly
you said that the Fed is prepared to do more if necessary. Could you
briefly comment on what sort of form additional action might take and
specifically what are the relative costs and benefits of doing more QE
versus more security extension?
 
     BERNANKE:
 
     Well, in terms of the inflation forecasts, again I think it should
be said as a preliminary point that economic projections have a lot of
uncertainty about them. We talk about that uncertainty in the survey of
economic projections. So we shouldn't take a false sense of precision
from those numbers.
 
     That being said, there is an issue about whether or not there is
sufficient stimulus in the economy.
 
     As I mentioned earlier, one problem is that we are now at the zero
bound and that the type of unconventional programs that are available,
we know less about them, they have various costs and risks. And for that
reason, you may get a different amount of financial accommodation in
this kind of regime than you would in one where short-term interest
rates can be varied freely. So I think that's really a critical issue.
 
     Now, in terms of the costs, I would list briefly large asset
purchases increase the size of the balance sheet, and therefore
ultimately will make exit a more extended process. The large asset
purchases, which means that the Fed owns a larger share of a particular
type of asset, may have implications for market functioning, which in
turn might affect the ability of the Fed to have stimulative effects on
the economy.
 
     There are some financial stability issues that we monitor and that
have to be taken into account.
 
     So any kind of assessment of appropriate policy must look both at
the outlook for the economy, and at the costs and risks associated with
new measures, new steps that might be taken.
 
     That being said, again, I think at this point we still do have
considerable scope to do more and we are prepared to do more. We will
continue to monitor the economy and see how things evolve.
 
     And again we are looking primarily at the labor market in this
respect. If we're not seeing a sustained improvement in the labor
market, that would require additional action.
 
     In terms of balance sheet actions, we are unlikely to do more
maturity extension for a while because we have taken that about as far
as we can. So we would have to take other types of steps in order to add
to the amount of stimulus in the economy.

QUESTION:
 
     Returning to Europe briefly. Some analysts have said that should
the situation deteriorate there the Fed could step in by buying European
sovereign debt (...). Are there any countries that you would rule out in
such a strategy?
 
     BERNANKE:
 
     The Federal Reserve isn't going to be buying European sovereign
debt, except we have a very limited amount of European sovereign debt as
part of our foreign exchange reserves.
 
     And it comes primarily from a small number of countries. So that is
not something we would be engaged in. 


 
 
+
про закон додда-франка… частные экономисты недовольны, говорят что для экономики плохо это



The Dodd-Frank financial regulatory reforms are <br style="padding: 20px;" />inhibiting economic growth through over-regulation, or "bandwidth risk" <br style="padding: 20px;" />in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, economists said Wednesday. <br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" />     "It's over 800 single spaced pages. It is a monster," said Peter <br style="padding: 20px;" />Wallison, codirector of the conservative American Enterprise Institute's <br style="padding: 20px;" />program on financial policy studies. <br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" />     "As the Dodd-Frank Act began to look like a likely enactment, the <br style="padding: 20px;" />GDP growth began to decline, it's never recovered to the point where it <br style="padding: 20px;" />was in the first quarter of 2010," Wallison said during a panel <br style="padding: 20px;" />discussion, "If we look at the housing market, exactly the same thing." <br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" />     Jim Angel, associate professor of finance at Georgetown University <br style="padding: 20px;" />said, "With all of the other things that the regulators are struggling <br style="padding: 20px;" />with, trying to figure out how to fit a non-bank into a bank regulatory <br style="padding: 20px;" />structure, it's like putting a round peg into a square hole."<br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" />     While economists on the panel, sponsored by the U.S. Chamber of <br style="padding: 20px;" />Commerce, agreed on the negative effects of Dodd-Frank Act, supporters <br style="padding: 20px;" />argue the reforms are needed in response to a lack of regulation of the <br style="padding: 20px;" />banking industry that led to the 2008 financial crisis. <br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" />     Massachusetts Rep. Barney Frank said in a video interview with the <br style="padding: 20px;" />New York Times, "The role of the public sector here is, as the private <br style="padding: 20px;" />sector innovates, to come up with appropriate regulations. And the goal <br style="padding: 20px;" />to try and get the best benefit from these innovations while minimizing <br style="padding: 20px;" />the harm." <br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" />     Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner has repeatedly stressed the need to <br style="padding: 20px;" />push ahead with the regulatory reforms, noting that the gaps in <br style="padding: 20px;" />oversight prior to the crisis have not been addressed.<br style="padding: 20px;" /> <br style="padding: 20px;" />     Angel, who called the bill "Dodd-Frankenstein," said government <br style="padding: 20px;" />agencies have gone beyond the scope of the reform. <br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" />     "Out of the hundreds of rule-makings that the regulators had been <br style="padding: 20px;" />tasked with doing, one thing Congress did not tell the regulators to do <br style="padding: 20px;" />was to increase the regulations on money market funds," Angel said, <br style="padding: 20px;" />noting the SEC already had dealt with the MMF weaknesses demonstrated in <br style="padding: 20px;" />the 2008 crisis. <br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" />     "Despite the regulatory traffic jam that's occurring right now with <br style="padding: 20px;" />regulatory agencies struggling to meet the deadlines, and in many cases <br style="padding: 20px;" />not able to, the regulators are still talking about, 'We need to do <br style="padding: 20px;" />something about money market funds!' And this mystifies me because this <br style="padding: 20px;" />is one of the safest financial products ever devised," Angel said. <br style="padding: 20px;" /><br style="padding: 20px;" />     The Association for Financial Professionals released a report at <br style="padding: 20px;" />the event warning of the potential consequences for MMFs, including the <br style="padding: 20px;" />risk "organizations would be less willing to invest in MMFs and/or would <br style="padding: 20px;" />reduce/eliminate their holdings of MMFs ... under three regulatory <br style="padding: 20px;" />reform proposals." 




 
+
The Dodd-Frank financial regulatory reforms are
inhibiting economic growth through over-regulation, or «bandwidth risk»
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, economists said Wednesday.
 
     «It's over 800 single spaced pages. It is a monster,» said Peter
Wallison, codirector of the conservative American Enterprise Institute's
program on financial policy studies.
 
     «As the Dodd-Frank Act began to look like a likely enactment, the
GDP growth began to decline, it's never recovered to the point where it
was in the first quarter of 2010,» Wallison said during a panel
discussion, «If we look at the housing market, exactly the same thing.»
 
     Jim Angel, associate professor of finance at Georgetown University
said, «With all of the other things that the regulators are struggling
with, trying to figure out how to fit a non-bank into a bank regulatory
structure, it's like putting a round peg into a square hole.»
 
     While economists on the panel, sponsored by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, agreed on the negative effects of Dodd-Frank Act, supporters
argue the reforms are needed in response to a lack of regulation of the
banking industry that led to the 2008 financial crisis.
 
     Massachusetts Rep. Barney Frank said in a video interview with the
New York Times, «The role of the public sector here is, as the private
sector innovates, to come up with appropriate regulations. And the goal
to try and get the best benefit from these innovations while minimizing
the harm.»
 
     Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner has repeatedly stressed the need to
push ahead with the regulatory reforms, noting that the gaps in
oversight prior to the crisis have not been addressed.
 
     Angel, who called the bill «Dodd-Frankenstein,» said government
agencies have gone beyond the scope of the reform.
 
     «Out of the hundreds of rule-makings that the regulators had been
tasked with doing, one thing Congress did not tell the regulators to do
was to increase the regulations on money market funds,» Angel said,
noting the SEC already had dealt with the MMF weaknesses demonstrated in
the 2008 crisis.
 
     «Despite the regulatory traffic jam that's occurring right now with
regulatory agencies struggling to meet the deadlines, and in many cases
not able to, the regulators are still talking about, 'We need to do
something about money market funds!' And this mystifies me because this
is one of the safest financial products ever devised,» Angel said.
 
     The Association for Financial Professionals released a report at
the event warning of the potential consequences for MMFs, including the
risk «organizations would be less willing to invest in MMFs and/or would
reduce/eliminate their holdings of MMFs… under three regulatory
reform proposals.»
+
Чикагская биржа увеличила время торгов некоторыми товарными фьючерсами
Despite the objection of some European traders, the
CME Group will extend pit trading for grains, oilseeds and ethanol
futures and options until 15:00 ET effective Monday, aligning the close
to that implemented for electronic trading on May 21.
 
     The CME Group, the CBOT's owner, said aligning the open outcry
close with the Globex close will make it less confusing to calculate the
closing price for daily settlement purposes.
 
     «The commercial grain industry is used to having settlement and
close at the same time,» the CME Group told the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission.
 
     «There are a limited number of market participants, primarily from
Europe, who argue that delaying the settlement an additional 45 minutes
is not necessary,» the CME Group notice to the CFTC said.
 
     But «the exchange has determined to adopt the consensus view,» the
CME Group said.
 
     The time change Monday will affect a wide range of contracts,
including CBOT Corn, Mini-Sized Corn, Soybeans, Mini-Sized Soybeans,
Wheat, Mini-Sized Wheat, Soybean Meal, Rough Rice and Oats futures and
options, plus related calendar spread options and inter-commodity spread
options.
+
Чиновник из ЕЦБ говорит что вопрос о снижении ставки будет рассмотрен в июле. 

Cutting interest rates could help bolster
confidence and will likely be discussed again at the next Governing
Council meeting, European Central Bank Executive Board member Benoit
Coeure said in an interview with the Financial Times released Wednesday
evening.
 
     Coeure also called on the Eurozone's bailout fund, the European
Financial Stability Facility, to buy government bonds in order to drive
down borrowing costs for troubled peripheral EMU states, noting severe
strains in sovereign debt markets.
 
     «Cutting rates is certainly an option as far as our monetary policy
is concerned. It was discussed at the last governing council meeting and
I would expect the next council to discuss it again, » Coeure said.
While it certainly would not fix the fundamental problems, it could 
«alleviate some of the consequences of the current situation, in
particular in terms of confidence,» he told the paper.
 
     Suggesting that he sees no obstacle to cutting the ECB's main
refinancing rate to a  new record low from the current 1%, Coeure noted
that «we are in a situation where there is no threat to medium-term
price stability.»
 
     The French board member hinted that the ECB would support EFSF
interventions in the secondary market. Under EFSF rules, the ECB must be
consulted before the fund buys sovereign bonds.
 
     «Current circumstances would probably warrant EFSF intervention in
the secondary market — provided that this happens against the right
background of political decisions and solutions to the underlying issues
and strong conditionality,» he said. 
 
     Coeure noted that the EFSF's E440 billion gives the fund enough
capacity to «alleviate temporary tensions on secondary markets,» and he
rejected the notion that given the ECB's unlimited capacity, the central
bank should step in instead.
 
     «We have a bond buying programme, the securities markets programme.
The SMP has not been terminated, but it is an instrument of monetary
policy. It is not an instrument that can be used to fix fiscal
difficulties or to help insolvent banks,» Coeure said. «Don't mix up the
central bank with the fiscal authorities.»
 
     Nevertheless, Coeure said that the SMP not only remains in the
ECB's toolbox but could be successful again. However, «we do not
consider that the SMP would be the best instrument to use at the current
juncture,» he said.
 
     Coeure also would not exclude the option of an additional LTRO, but
he dampened any expectations of immediate action. «Is a third LTRO
possible? Yes, it is possible, but it would probably be warranted only
in the face of generalized liquidity challenges — and it is probably not
the best instrument in the case of localized difficulties for banks,» he
said. 
 
     Localized difficulties in part relate to collateral shortages in
some banking sectors. «We have not reached the point where there is a
collateral shortage, but certainly the amount of excess collateral, the
collateral buffer — which is very substantial at the aggregate level in
the euro area — has become more strained in some places,» Coeure noted.
 
     «There is an ongoing reflection on how to alleviate these tensions.
What is important is that any adjustment of our collateral framework
should not increase the risk exposure of the Eurosystem,» he said.  «If
needed,»  the ECB could widen what is acceptable as collateral, «but
this would have to come with strict risk control, in particular with
haircuts,» he added.
 
+
Григорий, вроде бы хотят использовать EFSF для покупки долгов Испании и Италии. Каковы могут быть последствия для рынков?
+
Григорий в Питере на экономическом форуме, вычисляет «последствия» для российской экономики =)

14:00—15:00
Павильон 8А, Зал Конгрессов
ПЛЕНАРНОЕ ЗАСЕДАНИЕ
ЭФФЕКТИВНОЕ ЛИДЕРСТВО

ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

Отдыхает в общем… от евробардака =)
+
спасибо ))) а Вы, Патриция, что думаете по этому поводу? не превратят ли этот фонд в подобие мусорного ведра и почему ЕЦБ не выкупает?
+
При создании ЕвроФРС, мусорное ведро в хозяйстве всегда пригодится =)) Например ФРС, на продаже мусора уже ярды заработала… тайминг… — это главное =) И для европейского «мусора» придет своё время… оно ведь политически мусорное, а не экономически… А ЕЦБ это вотчина германии… и сделан он по принципам бундесбанка, и гансы не хотят «общий долговый рынок» пока не отожмут весь лишний «политический мусор» из идеи — фикс =)
+
ЕЦБ готовится вроде как снять ограничения на качество залогов при выдаче кредитов для банков… хотя что то сомнительно что бундесбанк на это пойдет без более сильного стресса на рынке


The European Central Bank may cut interest rates
as soon as next month and might also announce further loosening of its
collateral rules to ensure banks will have continued access to central
bank liquidity.
 
     Comments by Executive Board member Benoit Coeure in an interview
with the Financial Times published late Wednesday clearly suggest the
ECB is gearing up for action.
 
     «Cutting rates is certainly an option as far as our monetary policy
is concerned. It was discussed at the last governing council meeting and
I would expect the next council to discuss it again,» Coeure said. «We
are in a situation where there is no threat to medium-term price
stability.»
 
     Council members Ewald Nowotny and Jozef Makuch had previously
signalled a readiness to cut the main refinancing rate to a historic low
0.75% and the deposit rate to zero.
 
     President Mario Draghi last Friday said there were no inflationary
risks while warning of «increasing downside risks» to the economic
outlook. weak Eurozone's PMIs for June, released Thursday, further
underscored those risks.
 
     The PMIs showed private sector activity continuing to shrink as
quickly as it did in May, at almost the fastest pace in three years.
After signalling economic contraction for five consecutive months, the
index now shows that economic weakness is spreading from the periphery
to the core and is beginning to hit even the German economic powerhouse.
 
     While a rate cut appears increasingly likely, its remains a matter
of pure speculation. Coeure argued that the impact of a cut would
largely be psychological, which could argue for a more aggressive move.
On the other hand, a 50 basis point cut could stoke possibly unwanted
speculation that the ECB was approaching quantitative easing territory. 
 
     Coeure's comments also suggest that the central bank may not limit
its support measures to lowering borrowing cost. While he dampened
expectations of renewed bond market intervention and of another 3-year
LTRO in the near-term, he did concede that «if needed» the ECB may
further ease collateral rules.
 
     Caught in the negative feedback loop between weak sovereigns and
their banking systems, even solvent banks are running out of eligible
collateral as the debt crisis hits their bonds holdings and deposits.
The ECB been actively discussing various options to address the problem
for many weeks.
 
     Indeed, German weekly Die Welt reported on Wednesday that the
Governing Council had already agreed on a «significant» loosening of
collateral requirements at its mid-month meeting Thursday. According to
the report, the looser rules pertain in particular to mortgage backed
securities and should thus be particularly useful for the Spanish
banking sector.
 
     So far, there has been heavy resistance from the Bundesbank to
weakening collateral for fear of burdening the Eurosystem with ever
greater risks. However, the ECB may be running out of options to get
liquidity to where it is needed. As Coeure pointed out, simply launching
another LTRO would not be useful in addressing the problem.
 
     «The ECB has the crucial role of providing liquidity to sound bank
counterparties in return for adequate collateral...The Eurosystem will
continue to supply liquidity to solvent banks where needed,» Draghi
stressed Friday. 
 
     To keep the system afloat, the ECB may simply have to adjust its
definitions of «sound counterparty» or «adequate collateral» once more.
Indeed, it may already have done so.
 
 
+
Статья из WSJ по поводу перпесктив QE. 

 Если Федеральная резервная система США решится на еще один монетарный «толчок», чтобы простимулировать американскую экономику, то отчасти такое решение будет принято под давлением «тихого» бывшего профессора Беркли.

Зампред Совета управляющих ФРС Джанет Йеллен является одной из самых влиятельных персон, которая определяет политику мировых регуляторов. Она выступала за решительные действия Федрезерва, в то момент когда в Вашингтоне рассматривали «стимул» как ругательное слово. 


Йеллен не раз вступала в дискуссию с теми членами FOMC, которые опасаются, что уже при нынешнем уровне безработицы инфляционные процессы неизбежно возникнут в случае новых программ QE. В теории безработица и инфляция находятся в определенной количественной зависимости. Так называемая кривая Филипса (на нее ссылается госпожа Йеллен) устанавливает закономерность: чем ниже уровень инфляции, тем выше уровень безработицы, и наоборот. С повышением уровня безработицы покупательная способность населения уменьшается и не растет оплата труда. «На мой взгляд, сильная стимулирующая монетарная политика остается наиболее предпочтительной для ФРС в обозримом будущем. Федеральный комитет по открытым рынкам должен действовать в направлении максимального роста рынка труда и стабилизации уровня цен. ФРС требуется работать с рисками, угрожающими экономике США», — заявляла Йеллен. Эксперты отмечают, что власть ФРС сосредоточена в руках небольшого количества человек, очевидно наиболее влиятельным является глава Федрезерва Бен Бернанке, за ним следует Йеллен. «Ее влияние на ФРС неуклонно возрастает. Я думаю, она теперь, вместе с председателем и один или два других, один из самых влиятельных людей в системе»,- отметил Альфред Броддас, бывший президент ФРБ Ричмонда. Йеллен с 2009 г. стала членом Комитета по открытым рынкам ФРС США с правом голоса. Эксперты называли ее возможным преемником Бена Бернанке на посту председателя Федеральной резервной системы. В апреле 2010 г. президент Барак Обама выдвинул Йеллен в качестве вероятного преемника Дональда Кона на посту вице-президента Федеральной резервной системы, и в июле сенат одобрил ее кандидатуру. Столь быстрый взлет заставляет экспертов все больше учитывать мнение Йеллен, так как, несмотря на ее тихую манеру речи, в ФРС она известна своей жесткой позицией.
 
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