Банковский сектор : Агентство Moody's понижает кредитные рейтинги 15 глобальных банков

Событие долгожданное, учитывая что агентство  Moody's несколько раз переносило публикацию рейтингов американских банков и последний срок был обозначен на июнь. Уже после закрытия торгов в Нью-Йорке появилась официальная информация о том, что рейтинго 15 глобальных банков, в том числе американских понижены. Правда понижение рейтингов оказалось не таким жестким, как ожидалось до этого.

До публикации новых рейтингов, рыночные ожидания ориентировались на следующие параметры: Morgan Stanley, UBS and CS должны были получить снижение на 3 ступени. Банки Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Agricole, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC Holdings, JPM и RBC на 2 ступени. Банки Bank of America, RBS and Societe Generale на одну ступень.


В наиболее уязвимом положении был банк Morgan Stanley  так как базируясь на предыдущих комментариях от  Moody's рынок ждал, что рейтинг этого банка будет порезан сразу на 3 ступени, в итоге понизили только на 2 ступени.

После публикации такого рейтинга акции банка выросли почти на 5%, также подросли акции других банков и тут просто можно констатировать тот факт, что рынки заранее отыграли событие с рейтингами, еще за несколько часов до официальной публикации, так как банковские акции снизились в среднем на 3-5% в течении торгов в Нью-Йорке 21 июня. Самым важным моментом можно считать, что вопреки ожиданиям ни одному из упомянутых в заявлении от агентства рейтингам, не было присвоено статуса «мусорный» и таким образом опасения по поводу роста кредитных рисков на межбанковском рынке пока оказались излишними.  
 
In a statement, Moody's said:
 
     «Today's rating actions conclude the review initiated on 15
February 2012 when Moody's announced a ratings review prompted by its
reassessment of the volatility and risks that creditors of firms with
global capital markets operations face.
 
     „In the past, these risks have led many institutions to fail or to
require outside support, including several firms affected by today's
rating actions. Today's actions, however, reflect not only the credit
implications of capital markets operations. They also reflect (i) the
size and stability of earnings from non-capital markets activities of
each firm, (ii) capitalization, (iii) liquidity buffers, and (iv) other
considerations, including, as applicable, exposure to the operating
environment in Europe, any record of risk management problems, and risks
from exposure to US residential mortgages, commercial real estate or
legacy portfolios“.
 
     Moody's said it had taken ratings actions on the following
institutions:
 
     Bank of America Corporation
 
     Long-term senior unsecured debt to Baa2 from Baa1, outlook
     negative; Short-term P-2 affirmed
 
     Barclays plc
 
     Long-term issuer rating to A3 from A1, outlook negative; Short-term
     to P-2 from P-1
 
    Citigroup Inc.
 
     Long-term senior debt to Baa2 from A3, outlook negative; short-term
     P-2 affirmed
 
     Credit Suisse Group AG
 
     Provisional senior debt to (P)A2 from (P)Aa2, outlook stable;
     Provisional Short-term (P)P-1 affirmed
 
    Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
 
     Long-term senior unsecured debt to A3 from A1, outlook negative;
     Short-term to P-2 from P-1
 
    HSBC Holdings plc
 
     Long-term senior debt to Aa3 from Aa2, outlook negative;
     Provisional Short-term (P)P-1 affirmed
 
     JPMorgan Chase & Co.
 
     Long-term senior debt to A2 from Aa3, outlook negative; Short-term
     P-1 affirmed
 
    Morgan Stanley
 
     Long-term senior unsecured debt to Baa1 from A2; outlook
     negative; Short-term to P-2 from P-1
 
     Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc
 
     Long-term senior debt to Baa1 from A3, outlook negative;
     Short-term P-2 affirmed
 
     Moody's has taken action on the following operating company
     ratings:
 
     Bank of America, N.A.
 
     Long-term deposit rating to A3 from A2, outlook stable; Short-term
     to P-2 from P-1
 
     Barclays Bank plc
 
     Long-term issuer rating to A2 from Aa3, outlook negative;
     Short-term P-1 affirmed
 
     BNP Paribas
 
     Long-term debt and deposit rating to A2 from Aa3; outlook stable;
     Short-term P-1 affirmed
 
     Citibank, N.A.
 
     Long-term deposit rating to A3 from A1, outlook stable; Short-term
     to P-2 from P-1
 
     Credit Agricole S.A.
 
     Long-term debt and deposit rating to A2 from Aa3, outlook negative;
     Short-term P-1 affirmed
 
     Credit Suisse AG
 
     Long-term deposit and senior debt rating to A1 from Aa1, outlook
     stable; Short-term P-1 affirmed
 
     Deutsche Bank AG
 
     Long-term deposit rating to A2 from Aa3, outlook stable; Short-term
     P-1 affirmed
 
     Goldman Sachs Bank USA
 
     Long-term deposit rating to A2 from Aa3, outlook stable; Short-term
     P-1 affirmed
 
     HSBC Bank plc
 
     Long-term deposit rating to Aa3 from Aa2, outlook negative;
     Short-term P-1 affirmed
 
     JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
 
     Long-term deposit rating to Aa3 from Aa1, outlook stable;
     Short-term P-1 affirmed
 
     Morgan Stanley Bank, N.A.
 
     Long-term deposit rating to A3 from A1, outlook stable; Short-term
     to P-2 from P-1
 
     Royal Bank of Canada
 
     Long-term deposit rating to Aa3 from Aa1, outlook stable;
     Short-term P-1 affirmed
 
     Royal Bank of Scotland plc
 
     Long-term deposit rating to A3 from A2; outlook negative;
     Short-term to P-2 from P-1
 
     Societe Generale
 
     Long-term debt and deposit to A2 from A1; outlook stable;
     Short-term P-1 affirmed
 
     UBS AG
 
     Long-term debt and deposit to A2 from Aa3, outlook stable;
     Short-term P-1 confirmed.
 

Комментарии (6)

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"Подозрительная статья" на передовице WALL STREET JOURNAL. Раскручивается тема приписок к своим балансам со стороны европейских банков, причем в абстрактном вроде бы рассуждении о многих банках которые «делают ЭТО» вроде бы невзначай упоминают самый крупный банк испанский Сантандер. Якобы этот банк, в числе прочих повышал нормативы достаточности собственного капитала за счет так называемой «оптимизации» — понижал коэффициент риска по качеству некоторых активов которые были на балансе и за счет этой операции получалось так, что хороших активов становилось вроде бы больше, а плохих меньше. Потом якобы хорошие активы включались в капитал 1 уровня и банк показывал необходимые параметры устойчивости своего баланса. Выводы которые сделаны в этой статье- евробанки обманывают своих клиентов, так как когда выяснится что плохих активов гораздо больше, а достаточность капитала меньше — клиенты и вкладчики могут сильно пострадать.



 
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Regulators and investors are concerned that some European banks are artificially boosting a key measure of their financial health, a worry that is further eroding market confidence in the Continent's banks.
 
Such concerns have been building up for more than a year. But they have intensified lately, with a parade of banks announcing that they intend to increase their capital ratios—a key gauge of their abilities to absorb future losses—partly by tinkering with the way they assess the riskiness of their assets. Spanish banks, including Banco SantanderSA, are among those that have announced plans to boost their capital ratios by «optimizing» their risk weightings.
 
A number of European regulatory bodies recently have opened reviews into the matter. The U.K.'s Financial Services Authority has been among the most aggressive, recently vetoing some banks' proposed ways of assessing their assets, according to people familiar with the matter.
 
At issue is the way banks calculate and disclose their capital ratios. The ratios are comprised of certain types of equity expressed as a percentage of the bank's «risk-weighted assets»—a fuzzy measure that an increasing number of regulators and investors fear is subject to abuse by banks.
 
The idea behind assessing capital as a proportion of risk-weighted assets is that not all assets are created equal. A bond issued by a blue-chip company is presumably less likely to incur losses than a mortgage to a heavily indebted homeowner. Under the risk-weighting systems, banks are permitted to hold less capital against safer assets than they have to hold against riskier ones.
 
But banks enjoy wide discretion in how they assign weightings to different assets. If banks deem certain assets to be low-risk, that shrinks the denominator of the ratio and has the effect of boosting the banks' capital ratios.
 
A growing body of research by regulators, analysts and other experts indicates that the practice is conducted inconsistently among different banks and different countries and is potentially prone to manipulation. Pressure is mounting to use a standardized method of setting the risk weightings.
 
A number of European regulatory bodies recently have opened reviews into the matter. The U.K.'s Financial Services Authority has been among the most aggressive, recently vetoing some banks' proposed ways of assessing their assets, according to people familiar with the matter.
 
At issue is the way banks calculate and disclose their capital ratios. The ratios are comprised of certain types of equity expressed as a percentage of the bank's «risk-weighted assets»—a fuzzy measure that an increasing number of regulators and investors fear is subject to abuse by banks.
 
The idea behind assessing capital as a proportion of risk-weighted assets is that not all assets are created equal. A bond issued by a blue-chip company is presumably less likely to incur losses than a mortgage to a heavily indebted homeowner. Under the risk-weighting systems, banks are permitted to hold less capital against safer assets than they have to hold against riskier ones.
 
But banks enjoy wide discretion in how they assign weightings to different assets. If banks deem certain assets to be low-risk, that shrinks the denominator of the ratio and has the effect of boosting the banks' capital ratios.
 
A growing body of research by regulators, analysts and other experts indicates that the practice is conducted inconsistently among different banks and different countries and is potentially prone to manipulation. Pressure is mounting to use a standardized method of setting the risk weightings.
 
If banks underestimate the riskiness of their assets, their cushions to absorb losses could prove in a crisis to be perilously thin.
 
Relying on risk weightings «is like asking your children to grade their own homework,» said James Ferguson, a strategist at Westhouse Securities in London. «It's crucial that nothing has gone wrong with these calculations, or we're in trouble.»
 
The current «approach undermines confidence in the system, and this forces investors to require that banks hold more capital,» said Richard Black, a fund manager at Legal & General Investment Management in London.
 
Some U.S. bank executives, most notably J.P. Morgan Chase Chief Executive James Dimon, have said European banks are gaming the risk-weighting regime.
 
The concerns are intensifying now because lenders have until the end of June to comply with a European Banking Authority directive to come up with more than €100 billion ($127 billion) of new capital, a bid by regulators to alleviate concerns about the health of the Continent's financial system. In a progress report earlier this year, the EBA said that banks had outlined plans to fill about 16% of their holes by adopting new risk-weighting models or by tinkering with existing ones.
 
The EBA and other regulatory bodies, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, are conducting reviews to identify problems in how banks calculate the risk weightings and to try to iron out inconsistencies between countries and institutions. Their goal is to preserve the credibility of international bank capital rules.
 
There are wide discrepancies in how banks assess the riskiness of their assets.
 
Deutsche Bank AG was holding €2.16 trillion of assets last year, but on a risk-weighted basis that shrank to €381 billion—a ratio of 18%. Meanwhile, Spain's Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA BBVA.MC -0.51% was holding about €331 billion of risk-weighted assets out of €598 billion of total assets—a ratio of 55%.
 
The differences could simply reflect the varying levels of risk on banks' balance sheets. By that math, Deutsche Bank's assets are overall much safer than BBVA's.
 
But some investors and regulators are starting to treat low risk weightings as red flags.
 
«Higher RWA density is now considered as an indication of more prudent risk measurement, where banks are less likely to 'optimize' the computation of their risk-based capital ratios,» two International Monetary Fund researchers wrote in a paper this spring.
 
With investor skepticism mounting, some banks have started boasting to investors about their high ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. In a presentation to investors earlier this year, BBVA touted its 55% ratio as highest among its peer group.
 
In a presentation to investors this spring, Deutsche Bank finance chief Stefan Krausesaid the bank's low weightings reflect its safe balance sheet, which includes lots of loans to healthy German companies.
 
To see how banks can improve their capital cushions by reducing risk weightings, consider the case of Lloyds Banking Group PLC. LYG -3.09% The big British bank in 2010 switched the models it was using to calculate risk weightings on residential mortgages. The new model spat out average risk weightings of 16%, down from 21% in the previous system.
 
Assume that Lloyds is required to maintain a 9% ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets. If the £369 billion ($580 billion) of mortgages received an average 21% risk weighting, Lloyds would have to hold capital representing 9% of £77 billion of assets, or £6.9 billion. With an average risk weighting of 16%, the capital requirement falls to about £5.3 billion.
 
A Lloyds spokeswoman said the change in average risk weightings was based on the integration of different mortgage portfolios and that Financial Services Authority regulators approved the switch.
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Григорий, спасибо!
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после решения конституционного суда германии не признавать законный характер фонда ESM документ может не подписать президент Германии и таким образом вроде как ESM не может быть запущен с 9 июля так как нет законного основания со стороны Германии 


German president Joachim Gauck will not sign the ESM and 
fiscal compact, as the German Federal Constitutional Court has 
requested, says Der Spiegel. Following this decision, there were 
different reactions from the political spectrum; the Left characterised 
this as a «slap in the face» for Angela Merkel and her plans to push the 
fiscal compact through whilst the vice-chairman of her own party, Volker 
Kauder, said the president's decision is the «result of political 
rationality». 
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Moody's порезало рейтинг 28 испанским банкам, как и обещалось ранее… =)

Moody’s cuts ratings on 28 Spanish banks by 1-4 notches

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